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“I Need to Hurt You More”: Namibia’s Fight
to End Gender-Based Violence
F ollowing decades of civil conflict and antiapartheid struggle, Namibiaheld the first one-person, one-vote election in 1989. The countryachieved electoral democracy in 1990 and committed itself to a process
of national reconciliation. The early 1990s also saw the reconstitution of
civil society organizations and an expansion of international organizations.
It was a moment ripe for progressive social change and legislative transfor-
mation. This article examines one social movement that benefited from this
rapidly changing political space—the campaign to end gender-based vio-
lence. Through an analysis of gender scripts that preceded and persisted
long after the political conflict ended, we explore the gap between legisla-
tion and social transformation.
At the end of the first decade of democracy, Namibia had cultivated a
home-grown movement calling for stricter laws on rape. Women achieved
notable electoral success during this decade through the use of gender quo-
tas ðenforced by law at the local level and facilitated by voluntary politi-
cal party quotas at the national levelÞ, pressure from regional and national
women’s movements, and a closed-list proportional representation elec-
toral system ða strategy recognized for improving election victories for
women and minority groupsÞ, filling parliament with a small but critical
mass of allies ðBauer 2004; Bauer and Britton 2006Þ.1 This period corre-
sponded with the regional push for the advancement of women’s empower-
ment and development. The leaders of the Southern African Development
Community made sweeping commitments to advance the status of women
and to combat gender-based violence. This combination of forces, led most
notably by the national movement to end gender-based violence, culmi-
nated in Namibia’s Combating Rape Act ðNo. 8 of 2000Þ. The act is known
1 In a closed-list proportional representation system, the political parties select a list of
candidates prior to the election. The voters then vote for the party as a whole and do not have
a choice of candidates within each party. This often ensures that female candidates do not
get moved to lower positions on the list.
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as one of the world’s most progressive rape laws because of its expansive
definition of rape, its lack of gender-specific identifiers for victims and per-
petrators, its detailed description of coercive circumstances, its limitations
on the use of the survivor’s sexual history in criminal trials, and its prohi-
bition of marital rape ðThomas et al. 2011Þ. Yet Namibia continues to suf-
fer from epidemic levels of sexual violence. The end of armed conflict and
the advancement of women in the public sphere have been accompanied
by an increase in violence against women. As the fighting subsides, violence
against women increases ðSamuelson 2007Þ. This article examines that trou-
bling disjuncture.
In this article we highlight various perspectives of Namibian antirape
activists and political leaders concerning the factors contributing to sex-
ual violence in the country. By sexual violence, we are referring to rape,
domestic violence, and sexual assault. The antirape activists in the study
were also concerned about the changing nature of violence against women,
which, in their assessment, is becoming more gruesome and graphic. Sev-
eral dominant perspectives emerged in our study. Some activists attribute
the continued violence to a failure of accountability about war rape and too
narrow a conception of national reconciliation. According to many women
interviewed, during the war, women’s struggle for gender rights was sub-
ordinated to the struggle for national liberation. As occurred across the
continent, Namibian women were asked to put their quest for recognition
and equality second to the independence struggle.2 Subordinating the strug-
gle for gender rights to the struggle for national liberation—and, later, na-
tion building—created a situation in which gender issues are often publicly
advanced through legislation and campaigns for elected office but privately
restricted within households and through socially ascribed gender roles.
Other activists maintain that gender violence is linked to entrenched patri-
archal attitudes found throughout society. These attitudes sustain a per-
ception that women are akin to property, subject to regulation and con-
trol by men. Another view widely held in the country and discussed in many
of the interviews in our study is that gender violence is fueled by a backlash
against women, related to the progress some women have made in elected
office, the public sector, and business. Violence becomes symbolic:while not
targeting any specific group of women, men who feel threatened and dis-
enfranchised in the new dispensation are lashing out against the women in
their own lives—violently puttingwomen back in their place.Many of these
2 See Becker ð1995Þ, Bauer and Britton ð2006Þ, Fallon ð2008Þ, and Tripp et al. ð2009Þ.
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perceptions suggest that persistent patriarchal views normalize gender-
based violence.
In contrast to such patriarchal views, the Combating Rape Act pre-
sents one of the most progressive understandings of rape in the world and is
a vital tool that antirape activists use to combat gender violence and pro-
mote more progressive frameworks for gender equality. While significant
studies emphasize the implementation of the Combating Rape Act ðLAC
2006Þ, less attention has been paid to colonial and customary construc-
tions of rape and how these constructions frame contemporary debates.
Through archival research, we examine how contemporary discourses on
sexual violence are framed by assumptions embedded in colonial and cus-
tomary law. We explore how notions about degrees of rape—the idea
that some rapes are “real” or more harmful while other rapes are “accept-
able” or less harmful—originated in colonial laws, continued during the
independence struggle, and surface in rhetoric surrounding rape today.3
We center our discussion on the parliamentary debates surrounding
the Combating Rape Act because of their importance in the contem-
porary movement to end gender violence within the postwar context.
The parliamentary debates illuminate diverse attitudes toward gender vio-
lence, which can be conceived as competing gender scripts that signify
movement beyond past silences about rape while also reflecting continu-
ities in assumptions about rape that impede contemporary struggles to
end gender violence. Regressive gender scripts continue to plague wom-
en’s lives long after the war is over and after progressive laws have been
passed. The disjuncture between progressive law and regressive gender
scripts may help explain why Namibian efforts to address gender-based
violence remain incomplete.
3 The interdisciplinary methods in this essay rely centrally on a rhetorical analysis of the par-
liamentary debates preceding the passage of the Combating Rape Act, which is supplemented
by field-based research that Hannah Britton conducted in Namibia during two separate multi-
month fieldwork trips in 2007 and 2008. Britton conducted participant observations, seven
group interviews, and thirty-eight semistructured in-depth interviews with Namibian anti-
rape activists; members of Parliament, nongovernmental organizations, and the police and
justice system; social workers; prosecutors; and members of the medical community in three
research sites located within two different regions: one in the urban Khomas Region and two
more in the more rural Erongo Region. These interviews and observations are used in this
article to supplement the historical and rhetorical analysis. Britton’s fieldwork was supported
through a New Faculty General Research Fund grant from the Kansas University Center for Re-
search, the Kansas African Studies Center, the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and the De-
partment of Political Science at the University of Kansas.
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Twin legacies of struggle and silence
Namibia is classified as a postwar, postapartheid, democratizing country.
This emergent system is embroiled in a process of defining itself in re-
sponse to, and in opposition to, its past. Namibia confronts a legacy of
entrenched racism and sexism, civil and regional conflict, and state se-
crecy and violence. The state is plagued by resource inequality, scarcity of
public funds for social services, neoliberal imperatives that dictate policy
choices, growing dissatisfaction with the pace of transformation, and shal-
low notions of reconciliation. Namibia is ranked as an upper-middle-income
country, yet inequalities remain vast, and few resources are directed toward
pressing social issues like gender-based violence.
Aspects of Namibian history, including German colonization and the
implementation of apartheid by South Africa, prompt some scholars to
argue that Namibia’s history distinguishes it from other parts of Africa.
On closer examination, however, Namibia may represent a microcosm of
the continent. Namibia had one of the first twentieth-century genocides,
in which the Germans attempted to obliterate local resistance by killing
approximately 80 percent of the Herero population and half of the Nama
population. The German military then drove survivors of these mass kill-
ings off their land, sending many to forced labor camps, actions that set
the stage for apartheid in later years and, some argue, created a model for
the Holocaust. There were subsequent genocidal acts, including slaughters
of indigenous groups in 1912–15 ðGordon 2009Þ. Following Germany’s
defeat in World War I, the League of Nations issued a mandate that trans-
ferred control of the territory now known as Namibia to South Africa in
1920. South Africa continued to rule Namibia even after the UN General
Assembly voted to revoke the mandate in 1961.
The Namibian war for independence, lasting roughly from 1966 to
1988, was a protracted guerrilla war that crossed borders and pitted
neighbor against neighbor. The struggle for liberation in Namibia was
led by the South-West Africa People’s Organization ðSWAPOÞ and in-
cluded armed conflict among soldiers from Cuba, Angola, South Africa,
and Namibia ðBaines and Vale 2008Þ. After repeated attempts at Namib-
ian independence that involved UN diplomatic and peacekeeping inter-
vention, peace was eventually secured with a tripartite agreement among
South Africa, Angola, and Cuba ðwith the United States and the Soviet
Union serving as observersÞ that led to South Africa’s withdrawal and
Namibia’s official independence in 1990. The transition to independence
“was, in fact, a decolonization, closely supervised by international forces,
and facilitated by a ‘transitional pact’” ðBauer 2001, 36Þ. It occurred dur-
ing an upsurge of support for neoliberal economics and multiparty poli-
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tics, and this combination shaped the contours of the new constitution
ðBauer 2001, 36Þ.
Despite the violence of the twenty-six-year conflict, and over one hun-
dred years of foreign occupation, Namibia’s transition is often championed
as a model of international diplomacy and mediated transitions, espe-
cially in the face of continued civil and regional conflicts across the globe
ðMelber and Saunders 2007Þ. In 1990, political leaders committed them-
selves to a policy of national reconciliation, focusing on unity, respect,
and progress. But, unlike many African governments, the new Namibian
government chose to move forward from the nation’s war-torn past with-
out a formal national truth commission or criminal tribunals. While com-
mitting themselves to national reconciliation, leaders opted to forgo in-
stitutionalized, public processes of transformational justice and pursued
amnesty for past abuses. Many suggest that the liberation-movement-
turned-ruling-party, SWAPO, would have been implicated in torture and
disappearances, and so, as Heike Becker ð2011, 522Þ observes, “officially
sanctioned forgetting has been the cornerstone” of the 1990 Policy of
National Reconciliation. Although South African forces were assumed to
be responsible for most of the abuses and violence, accusations of wrong-
doing followed SWAPO for decades, charges that were amplified once
SWAPO detainees returned to Namibia after independence ðConway 2003Þ.
The International Committee of the Red Cross ðICRCÞ, the South Afri-
can Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the International Crim-
inal Court have sought to investigate SWAPO leaders for the violence
they may have perpetrated. Debate continues about the best approach to
SWAPO’s alleged abuses: dialogue, confrontation, or amnesia. Many in the
press and public have advocated moving forward. Others worry that shal-
low reconciliation threatens the democracy still under construction ðHohn
2010Þ, contributing to the continuation of dominant party politics and the
consolidation of executive power ðBauer 2001Þ.
The state’s desire to forget the past is further complicated in terms of
gender. Women served as a vital force in the Namibia liberation move-
ment as soldiers, activists, medical professionals, and struggle participants
ðBecker 1995Þ, yet conscious decisions placed gender issues second to the
liberation struggle, as in much of Africa ðBauer and Britton 2006; Fallon
2008; Tripp et al. 2009Þ. This normalized gender scripts that designated
women’s rights secondary to nation building rather than regarding these
matters as interdependent.
As in other southern African conflicts where “women took up the ap-
parently divergent roles of warriors and supporters” ðSamuelson 2007,
834Þ, tensions persist between, first, an authentic, progressive attitude among
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party leaders and decision makers to advance the cause of women; and, sec-
ond, regressive notions of women’s position in society that are often strin-
gently maintained, even by leaders in parliament ðHubbard 2007Þ. Women
have secured notable levels of political representation and have passed signifi-
cant legislation ðBauer 2004Þ. Through local laws and voluntary party
quotas, women followed the fast track to representation found elsewhere on
the continent ðBauer and Britton 2006Þ.
Women across Africa mobilized during national struggles for libera-
tion, and they maintain reputations as former liberation leaders and fight-
ers. What differentiated the transitions of the 1960s–1970s from the tran-
sitions of the 1980s–1990s, however, was that women learned that they
must act quickly to secure public rights, lest they be relegated to the domes-
tic sphere. A process of political learning shaped women’s activism across
the continent. In the 1980s and 1990s, domestic and international wom-
en’s groups pressured governments to rewrite electoral laws and systems
during transitions.4 Continent-wide measures increased the representa-
tion of women in office on normative grounds ði.e., this was the right thing
to doÞ and because African leaders wished to demonstrate their legitimacy.
But gaining political office and drafting progressive feminist legislation
were only the first steps on the path toward improving the status of women.
Legislation must be translated into concrete policies to change women’s
lives. Many nations have stalled in implementing progressive legislation,
creating concern among scholars and antirape activists that the success women
have had in the public sphere in Namibia and across the region is fueling a
backlash of violence against women in the postwar era.5
The context of gender-based violence in Namibia
High levels of reported sexual violence in Namibia call for explanation. At
the 2007 Namibian national conference to combat gender-based violence,
explanations ran the gamut from claims that violence is increasing because
of the influence of Western media, alcohol abuse, and the destruction of
indigenous values to claims of too much religion or too little religion.
One theory—a theory to which we strongly object—is that the violence
stems from cultural phenomena. This inherently racist explanation fails to
acknowledge that violence against women cuts across cultures. There is
nothing uniquely Namibian, or African, about gender violence. Culture
4 See Britton ð2005Þ, Bauer and Britton ð2006Þ, Fallon ð2008Þ, and Tripp et al. ð2009Þ.
5 See LeBeau, Iipinge, and Conteh ð2004Þ, LeBeau and Spence ð2004Þ, Britton ð2006Þ,
Moffett ð2006Þ, and Bhana, de Lange, and Mitchell ð2009Þ.
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does not cause violence. Uma Narayan ð1997Þ and December Green
ð1999Þ point out that gender violence replicates and entrenches social scripts
of gender inequality and patriarchal dominance. Cultural explanations are
fraught with biases that often limit understanding of the causes of violence.
Participants in the conference also gave credence to the idea that Western
television, movies, and music—which fetishize the comingling of violence
and sex—glamorize promiscuity and promote alcohol and drug use. Blam-
ing promiscuity and substance abuse for gender-based violence, however,
holds the victim accountable for her assault ðEstrich 1986; Torrey 1995Þ.
In contrast to a culture-based explanation, Norman Tjombe of the Legal
Assistance Centre ðLACÞ, located in Namibia, contends that gender violence
exists because of patriarchal power.6 Although there is an ever-increasing
globalization of media influences, sexual violence and alcohol use predate
this influence, and sexual violence continues to occur in cultures where
such influence is minimized. Tjombe argues that until a radical alteration of
the patriarchal gender regime occurs, the power imbalance will continue.
While culture is not an explanation for gender-based violence, con-
text may be a relevant factor. Patriarchy is not invariant. Legacies of oc-
cupation, war, and apartheid create a particular context of violence in Na-
mibia. Rape was employed as a tool for enforcing racial hierarchies under
de facto colonial rule and apartheid ðScully 1995; Meintjes, Pillay, and Tur-
shen 2001Þ. While Namibia never witnessed the levels of genocidal rape
seen in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the former
Namibian government and South African forces used sexual violence to
demoralize the opposition. But opposition forces also employed this par-
ticular brand of violence to control women soldiers within their own ranks.
During the independence struggle, understandings of rape became bi-
furcated. A line was drawn between the rape of civilians by South African
forces and the rape of female combatants by their peers or commanding of-
ficers, generating a national script that accredited degrees of rape related to
women’s various roles during conflict ðGreen 1999; Krog 2001; Scanlon
2008Þ.
In her firsthand account of life in the military resistance, Teckla Shi-
kola ð1998Þ captures this bifurcated view. She reserves “real” rape for the
actions of South African military forces in the course of their sweeping
attacks on Namibian communities: “Real rape occurred inside Namibia,
rather than in the battle zones. Women in the villages were raped by the
6 Tjombe made this statement at the National Conference on Gender-Based Violence,
which was hosted by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare and held in Wind-
hoek, June 19–22, 2007.
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black forces. Those who were not raped were killed or beaten and after-
wards their crops were destroyed and they abandoned their houses”
ð145Þ. South African forces and members of the all-black South West
African Territorial Force committed these rapes: “The South Africans
really knew how to divide and rule. They made sure it was the black troops
that raped” ð145Þ. Shikola distinguishes between “real rape” and some-
thing else, something different:
I didn’t really see rape cases as such, but you know, sometimes,
when you are coming from home, you are new, and they train you
in the army to say “yes.” Whenever someone in charge calls you,
you shouldn’t refuse, you don’t say no, you have to go. You feel
scared of saying no, you cannot talk directly to a commander. Some-
times the chiefs would call out these poor young girls fresh from
home. The chiefs made love to them, and the women became preg-
nant without knowing the person who impregnated them, some-
times they didn’t even know his name. Some commanders had fif-
teen or eighteen kids. It is not really rape in a direct way as such
but just the way the chiefs were. I didn’t hear of any case where
someone was raped. Maybe it happened in the civilian camps, or
maybe women didn’t come forward because they felt ashamed about
reporting to people what had happened. I haven’t really known a case
where a woman went and reported that she had been raped. ð143Þ
Shikola clearly hesitates to label the sexual violence she and other women
combatants experienced as “real rape” ðEstrich 1986Þ. Rape by comrades
becomes part of their role as combatants. Shikola recognizes the harm
involved in the acts, but she never heard it called rape. Her interpreta-
tion leaves space for female agency even in the face of pronounced sex-
ism and sexual violence. Yet this example also underscores the idea that
part of women’s service to nation building is defined by submission to cer-
tain unwanted sexual encounters. Rape becomes “manifestly coercive yet
consensual” ðSamuelson 2007, 843Þ. Rape is “often simply viewed as an
‘unfortunate’ consequence of war” ðScanlon 2008, 31Þ.
A conception of degrees of rape is not inherent in Namibian culture.7
A broader legal rhetoric draws similar distinctions. Sexual offense laws
7 The notion of degrees of rape can be observed in conflicts across the continent; see
Green ð1999Þ, Turshen ð2000Þ, Krog ð2001Þ, Bowman ð2003Þ,Utas ð2005Þ, and Scanlon ð2008Þ.
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in Namibia are rooted in the same common-law tradition as in Western
societies and inherit problematic assumptions concerning degrees of rape
ðSchwikkard 2009Þ. Susan Estrich ð1986Þ first delineated this jagged edge
in rape law: “real” rape is constructed as involuntary and conducted by a
stranger ði.e., not the commanders of the female combatantsÞ; other rapes
are considered questionable in terms of legal and social standards, and
often the survivor is deemed culpable in some way.
Claims about degrees of rape fail to acknowledge that both forms of
rape constitute real rape while also reinforcing multiple hierarchies. For ex-
ample, the South Africans were able to capitalize upon the idea of “real”
rape, even if unwittingly, to stigmatize both the black troops and the women
who were raped. As Pascale Bos ð2006Þ has noted in another context, in-
terpretations of wartime/genocidal rape often ascribe causality to the pred-
atory nature of particular ethnic groups or to the objective of ethnic cleans-
ing, while peacetime/everyday rapes are attributed to sexual urges. But the
construction of this binary obscures more than it reveals.
SWAPO commanders’ sexual abuse of women within their units cre-
ated gendered hierarchies among Namibians while also adding an air of
illegitimacy and lack of patriotism to any allegation that these sexual en-
counters constituted rape. Silence is always a problem for gender vio-
lence ðGreen 1999Þ, but when silence is infused with calls for loyalty, na-
tionalism, and patriotism, it becomes more intractable ðTurshen 2000;
Utas 2005Þ. Resistance fighters who experienced rape were not only con-
demned to silence, their silence sustained the facade that these sexual
exchanges were voluntary and consensual. The absence of social mobili-
zation against this form of sexual violence during war quietly reinforced
oppressive gender scripts during and after the war.
In postwar Namibia there is continuity and discontinuity in the mean-
ing ascribed to gender, rape, and social transformation in the state and so-
ciety. Even before the end of apartheid rule, activists and legal organiza-
tions throughout the country began pressing for comprehensive changes
to existing legislation, including stiffer penalties for perpetrators and fun-
damental revisions to the definition of rape. Pressure continued through-
out the 1990s and included legal submissions and lobbying as well as
mass protests, marches, and demonstrations ðHubbard 2007Þ. Local com-
munities often protested for stronger laws following the rapes of com-
munity members. The increased visibility of rape, in particular the rape of
young children, mobilized widespread political action. A solidified grass-
roots movement, manifested in community-based action, emerged in re-
sponse to specific horrific rapes.
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The antirape activists in Namibia focused much of their movement on
passing strong legislation against rape. In a campaign that featured women
as agents of transformation and empowerment mobilizing against expe-
riences of victimhood, women played central roles in constructing a law that
gives the state the ability to confront rape swiftly through prosecutions.
The timing of this legislative campaign also benefited from the influence of
the international anti–violence against women campaign ðWeldon 2002Þ.
While working to ensure that the law was a domestic creation, legal ex-
perts drafting the Namibian legislation had the benefit of knowing which
types of legislation had proven successful internationally ðLAC 2006Þ. The
resulting Combating Rape Act is important for understanding how pro-
gressive legislation, influenced by activists and legislative experts outside
of government, has focused the state on rape prosecutions. Yet the prev-
alence of certain gender scripts affects which rapes are prosecuted.
Passage of the Combating Rape Act was a vital victory and marks sig-
nificant progress in Namibia. Yet the law coexists with increasing levels
of gender violence, continuing silence about certain kinds of rape, and per-
sisting rape myths.
The Combating Rape Act
The Combating Rape Act represented a long-sought-after victory for
antirape activists throughout Namibia. Several significant legislative ad-
vances deserve mention. In addition to minimum sentencing and stiff
bail provisions, the 2000 act reoriented the legal system toward a compre-
hensive, victim-centered approach. The definition of rape was expanded
in two critical ways. First, it included men, women, boys, and girls. Sec-
ond, it was altered to include sexual violations, including oral rape; rape
with objects; rape with any body part; any form of genital stimulation, in-
cluding forced masturbation of oneself; gang rape; and forced sexual acts
with animals. Despite objections by some members of Parliament ðdis-
cussed belowÞ, the act includes marital rape, and it states that, “No mar-
riage or other relationship shall constitute a defence to a charge of rape
under this Act.” Thus, the act specifically rejects the logic behind “degrees
of rape.”
The act also takes important strides in expanding the types of evi-
dence and arguments admissible in court. Prior to 2000, standards for
evidence inNamibiawerebased in theEnglish ðandSouthAfricanÞ common-
lawtradition, which requires that accusations of sexual violence be judged
by different evidentiary standards than other crimes ðSchwikkard 2009Þ.
The 2000 act shifted the evidentiary standards to more victim-centered
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criteria. The act ended the requirement that complainants demonstrate
nonconsent, which placed survivors in a defensive, and often impossible,
legal position ðLAC 2006Þ. Instead, the act shifts to an examination of
the use of force by the accused, defining force and coercion broadly
to include physical force or threats of physical force, psychological threats,
threats to some other person, and unlawful detention. Sexual acts are
regarded as coerced if the complainant is incapacitated in some way by
disability or intoxication.
The 2000 act no longer allows questions or evidence about the com-
plainant’s previous sexual history, experience, or conduct, with a few strict
exceptions. The prosecution can bring forward evidence of past sexual
offenses of the accused if that is relevant to establish a pattern of be-
havior ðbut not to prove the nature or character of the accusedÞ. The act
abolishes the “special cautionary rule,” which required the court to treat
accusations of sexual assault with caution, based on the widely held myth
that rape charges were more likely than other types of accusations to
be false ðSchwikkard 2009Þ. The 2000 act also mandates the highest sen-
tencing penalties for knowingly spreading HIV/AIDS through rape ðLAC
2006Þ.
One shortcoming is that the act is focused on prosecution, so com-
bating rape becomes synonymous with law enforcement, prosecution,
and punishment. Although this is an important step, the act lacks pro-
visions for prevention and rehabilitation. It does not address the causes
of gender violence, does not suggest programs to address social attitudes,
does not propose the creation of task forces, and does not outline services
for survivors or perpetrators—all of which regional legislation has recom-
mended.
Even with these limitations, Namibia still has one of the strongest,
most progressive rape acts globally. Legislation is only effective, however,
if implementation structures are in place, and it is in the realm of imple-
mentation that Namibia struggles. While the World Bank regards Namibia
as an upper-middle-income country, in an era of structural adjustment, lead-
ers find it difficult to properly fund programs designed to combat gender-
based violence. From financial resource deficits that undermine evidence
collection, storage, and analysis to human resource deficits that limit the
availability of social workers, medical professionals, and legal assistance,
Namibia struggles to overcome gaps between its stated national priorities
and its financial resources.
Policy makers assert that implementation fails due to lack of fund-
ing. But economic issues may not be the only barrier to full implemen-
tation of the law. As the LAC has noted, “While the text of the Combating
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of Rape Act leaves little room for ambiguity, the subtext of its enforce-
ment reveals that its progressive message about a woman’s control over her
own sexuality has not been fully internalised in Namibian society” ðLAC
2009, 6Þ. If prevalent discourses around rape were reframed, funding pri-
orities and social responses to rapemight be transformed.
Rhetoric of rape: Debating the Combating Rape Act
The progressive nature of the Combating Rape Act is particularly no-
table given the common-law tradition that shaped earlier definitions of
rape.8 In common-law traditions, the harm of rape is construed in terms
of damage inflicted upon the community rather than harm inflicted upon
the victim.9 Common law also defined some acts of rape as worse than
others. The category of “real rape” required demonstration of noncon-
sent, particularly through physical resistance ðEstrich 1986; Luchjenbro-
ers and Aldridge 2007, 342; Orenstein 2007, 1587Þ. To fit the definition
of “real rape,” the rapist must be a stranger who attacked an innocent
woman as she valiantly fought him off ðTemkin 2002, 51Þ. These tradi-
tional assumptions about what acts constitute rape, who can rightfully be
seen as a rapist, and who qualifies as a rape victim haunt the debates sur-
rounding the Combating Rape Act. Some prominent Namibian political
leaders articulated assumptions about “real rape” during the parliamentary
debates, perpetuating distinctions that the bill was designed to eliminate.
The parliamentary debates rely on the trope of the unquestionably in-
nocent victim juxtaposed against the brutal perverted rapist. The clear-
8 Prior to the 2000 act, Namibia’s rape laws were based in the same common-law tradi-
tion as that of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The common-law tra-
dition dates back to Roman law and was recorded in treatises during the Middle Ages all over
Europe. Preindependence Namibian laws are linked to the common-law legal codes ðlikely
through their colonial heritageÞ.
9 Under common law, rape is a crime against the state and not the person. In fourteenth-
century England, defiling a woman was an act of stealing her honor and virtue, values that
were directly tied to her worth in her family and community. Bracton is the first legal treatise
in common law to note that only virgins can be raped. Bracton was written by a largely un-
known assemblage of authors ðnotably Henry de BractonÞ in thirteenth-century England. It was
a pragmatic legal treatise recording the Roman legal traditions of Britain for use by judges
and educated people on all manner of offenses. It is one of the first common-law codifica-
tions of the law that only virgins can be raped. See http://bracton.law.harvard.edu. In the
common-law tradition, there are different classes of rape that require different levels of pun-
ishment. The different levels of rape are no longer codified into German ðBoyne 2010, 1321Þ
or Namibian law, but the assumptions of that standard continue in the “real rape” myth.
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est, most reprehensible types of rape within the broader “real rape” cat-
egory are the rapes of small children and innocent women. Men who com-
mit these violent acts deserve the most draconian punishments.10 This at-
titude is expressed in the assertions of Buddy Wentworth, the deputy
minister of higher education, vocational training, science, and technology:
I feel rape is something where the perpetrator is seeking sexual
gratification. In my mind I cannot see how a male, an adult male
can obtain sexual gratification raping a one year, two year or three
year old child. That person who commits that crime is not fit ever,
ever to be left free in society again. Never, ever, because somebody
that does that has something radically wrong with his mind. That
person should never be exposed to society again. That is really some-
thing different. That person cannot be cured, he is a psychopath.
That person falls within the category of a dangerous psychopath and
should never be let out.11
This discourse suggests that perpetrators are beyond rehabilitation
because they are pathologically ill. Siegfried Wohler, the deputy minister
of lands, resettlement, and rehabilitation, agrees that rapists are monsters
who prey on the weakest members of society.12 Similarly, Hadino Hish-
ongwa, the deputy minister of youth and sport, associates rape with a
form of mental illness that is particularly dangerous because it is infec-
tious: “These people are mentally sick, thus they are dangerous to live in
our midst, so they must be totally isolated and banished to those isolated
places. . . . Normally if one is suffering from an infectious disease, it is
always recommended that such a person should be isolated, and I believe
in this case of rape the person is also infected with an infectious mental
disorder and, therefore, does not deserve to live among the people.”13 When
rapists are pathologized, a gulf is created between “real rape” and practices
of domestic violence or marital rape, which are normalized and rendered
invisible.
Pathologized constructions of rape also posit an ideal rape victim—
innocent women and children who are in need of protection. The long
10 Pamela J. Schwikkard ð2009Þ cites Bracton as an important text establishing the ba-
sics for how Namibian rape law has developed. In Bracton, draconian punishments were
reserved for the rape of virgins by members of neighboring villages. Men who raped vir-
gins were to be punished with torture and death.
11 “Combatting Rape Bill: Second Reading,”Hansard, June 3, 1999, 82.
12 “Combatting Rape Bill: Resumption of Second Reading,”Hansard, June 8, 1999, 96.
13 Ibid., 115.
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association between common law and the domestication of women,
however, makes it difficult for adult women to maintain a level of inno-
cence. Indeed, Susan Brownmiller ð1975Þ and Caroline Joan Picart ð2003Þ
suggest that the more a woman transgresses domestic roles, the more
vulnerable she becomes to rape and the more culpable she is held for her
own violation. The common-law standard allowed admission of evidence
pertaining to the moral character of the victim ðSchwikkard 2009, 22Þ.14
Nonconformance with traditional moral standards could undermine the
prospects for criminal convictions even in the context of violent sexual
assaults ðTorrey 1995Þ.
Within the parliamentary debates, widowed and elderly women were
regarded as a special class in need of protection. As MP Ruppel argued,
“I think it is also bad, very bad if elderly women, widows, are attacked by
young able men at night in their homes and their throats cut.”15 In call-
ing attention to attacks against elderly women and widows in their homes
as particularly egregious crimes, Ruppel shores up the association between
women and the private sphere. The innocence of widows and elderly women
is constituted in part by their being in their homes at the time of attack.
They are not out in the middle of the night, nor are they joining armed
struggles. Left vulnerable by the loss of her husband, an innocent widow
is worthy of protection. An elderly woman is an innocent victim. Because
of her age, she is assumed to be beyond impropriety. An innocent woman
is seen as the “pride of her nation and should, therefore be protected against
such brutal attacks against her gender,” stated Clara G. Bohitile, deputy
minister of basic education and culture.16
Beyond the very young and the very old, it is more difficult to dem-
onstrate innocence. Consider, for example, the statement of Ngarikutuke
Tjiriange, the minister of justice who attempted to defend the rights of
all women in the debates: “Even women with a bad sexual reputation
should still not be raped.”17 The “even” in this sentence indicates a hes-
itation toward women who are less than innocent. The hesitation was
more pronounced in the warning given by another member of parliament,
Philemon Moongo, who suggested that certain behaviors provoke rape:
“Sometimes the women are also misbehaving. You see women walking in
14 Schwikkard ð2009Þ dates this rule back to the English courts in the nineteenth century,
where the understanding was that no decent woman would be having sex outside marriage.
15 “Combatting Rape Bill: Resumption of Second Reading,”Hansard, June 8, 1999, 106.
16 “Combating Rape Bill: Resumption of Second Reading,”Hansard , June 9, 1999, 144.
Note that on June 9, 1999,Hansard began to list the debates as “Combating” and not “Com-
batting.”
17 “Combatting Rape Bill: Second Reading,” Hansard, June 3, 1999, 74.
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the streets at 2 o’clock at night where the situation is not safe . . . some
women are still ignorant of the unsafe situation at the moment. I appeal to
Namibian women to behave well and not to wear mini dresses. Sometimes
it provokes the men. I know it is the right of a woman to wear the dress she
wants, but we must know the situation is very bad.”18
Shikola’s ð1998Þ discussion of sexual violence among resistance fight-
ers suggests just how difficult it is to preserve one’s status as innocent
in the context of armed conflict. When women take on the role of com-
batants, they enter a male-dominated domain. By crossing traditional gen-
der boundaries, they purportedly put themselves in harm’s way. They vol-
untarily assume an obligation to armed struggle that supercedes everyday
concerns about bodily integrity. In consenting to the military chain of com-
mand, they agree to obey all orders. They accept the sexual assaults of their
commanders “as just the way the chiefs were.”
Both Netumbo Ndiatwah ðnow Netumbo Nandi-NdiatwahÞ, the di-
rector general of women’s affairs, and Ngarikutuke Tjiriange, the minister
of justice, suggested that parts of the bill would be difficult to enforce
because notions about “real rape” persist within the Namibian populace.19
When such mistaken notions are widespread, many victims may fail to
recognize their lived experience as rape, and they may refrain from seek-
ing medical or legal services ðTorrey 1995Þ. Government programs and
educational campaigns are needed to transform these views.
Marital rape
Like common law, customary law ðthe unwritten traditional laws of a
particular peopleÞ in many nations conflated marriage with the husband’s
sexual access to his wife. The LAC report on rape in Namibia documented
confusion among men and women about marital rape. Some women ac-
cept “forced sex as an inevitable part of marriage” ð2006, 41Þ.20 Some
participants in the parliamentary debates about marital rape insisted that a
husband cannot rape his wife: “There is no rape in marriage. That cannot
be true. There is no rape inmarriage. The two agreed to come together and
they know what will take place through thick and thin. When you are on
18 Ibid., 79.
19 See “Combating Rape Bill: Resumption of Second Reading,”Hansard, 146, June 9,
1999, and “Combatting Rape Bill: Second Reading,”Hansard , June 3, 1999, 70, respectively.
20 British and German colonial law, on which Namibian law is based, also maintained that
women were the property of their husbands in marriage, and thus consent to sexual rela-
tions was unnecessary since sex is the right of any husband ðArchampong and Sampson 2010,
511–12, 516Þ.
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honeymoon you will never talk of rape, but when marriage turns sour,
that is when one could talk about rape” ðHadino Hishongwa, deputy
minister of youth and sportÞ.21 Somemembers of parliament, such as Petrus
Iilonga, argued that acknowledging marital rape served only to distract
from “real rape.”22
The 2003 court case S v. Lopez indicates that misunderstandings about
marital rape extend beyond the legislative branch of government.23 In S v.
Lopez, a husband was found guilty of raping his wife, but his sentence was
reduced from ten to five years. In issuing its ruling, the court noted that
“the appellant’s wife for some years is no stranger to having sexual in-
tercourse with him,” thereby suggesting that “it is more traumatizing
to be raped by a stranger than by a man once loved and trusted” ðLAC
2006, 187Þ.
In its 2009 study, the LAC reported “that many men and women are
suspended between two conceptions of rape. While one is rooted in what
they know the law to be, the other stems from social, cultural, and histor-
ical attitudes that are antithetical to a full recognition of what constitutes
rape” ð6Þ. According to LAC, some women perceived “the crime of marital
rape” as an artifact of the Combating Rape Act. They identified “certain
types of rape—particularly rape between past and present sexual partners—
as mere violations of new national regulations rather than serious criminal
offences” ð6Þ.
The assumption that marriage confers upon the husband a right to
have sex with his wife carries over into periods of separation. As the di-
rector general of women’s affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, notes, prior
to the passage of the Combating Rape Act, the law did not allow wives
separated from their husbands to deny them sexual access until a divorce
was granted:
In referring to rape within marriage, women in Namibia are faced
with a problem when men force sex on them during separations.
In that case when ½the two are l½iving in separate houses due to
problems that they may want to sort out, according to the current
law, a man is at liberty to enter the other house and force sex on
that woman and she will have no right to lay a charge of rape, as
they have not been officially divorced. . . . I realize that there are
mixed feelings about a man having sex with his wife against her
21 “Combatting Rape Bill: Resumption of Second Reading,”Hansard , June 8, 1999, 115.
22 Ibid., 119.
23 S v. Lopez 2003 NR 162 ðHCÞ.
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will. Some people feel that forced sex within a marriage is wrong,
but wondered if it should be called rape.24
Confusion about “real rape,” then, may be tied to legacies of common
law, colonial statutes, and customary law. Customary law in Namibia al-
lowed perpetrators of gender violence to make financial restitution to a
victim’s family under certain circumstances. During parliamentary debates,
several members of parliament referred to the custom of the rapist paying
remittances to the victim’s family as a part of the punishment for rape.25
Although monetary compensation for a survivor to cover the costs of coun-
seling, medical attention, and training to create a new life for himself or her-
self may be helpful, compensation awarded to a survivor’s family reinforces
familial gender dynamics that privilege men.
The 2009 LAC report identified other problematic effects associated
with compensatory schemes. Monetary compensation for the rape of a
family member can reinforce the notion that rape is a crime that can be
repaid, as opposed to a crime against human dignity ðLAC 2009, 31Þ. It
can also introduce new modes of gender power and gender vulnerabil-
ity: “The way that compensation is arranged in many communities today
amounts to bribery and coercion, and converts a woman’s right to sexual
autonomy into a property right which is controlled by male members
of her family” ðLAC 2009, iiÞ. In addition, the LAC found that the pri-
mary reason women withdrew rape complaints was because they—or their
families—received compensation.
“I need to hurt you more”: Qualitative changes in the nature
of violent sexual crimes
Interviews with social workers and police in Namibia in 2007 and 2008
called attention not only to increases in the incidence of sexual assault
but also to a qualitative change in the nature of gender-based violence.
According to many, sexual assault has become more brutal. Interview
participants from every sector of government and civil society stated that
24 “Combating Rape Bill: Resumption of Second Reading,”Hansard , June 9, 1999, 146.
25 “Combatting Rape Bill: Resumption of Second Reading,”Hansard, June 8, 1999, 114.
See also Jacobus Willem Francois “Kosie” Pretorius, “Combatting Rape Bill: Second Read-
ing,”Hansard, June 3, 1999, 76, and in the same issue, Philemon Moongo, 80, and Andimba
Toivo ya Toivo, 83; also see Hadino Hishongwa, “Combatting Rape Bill: Resumption of Sec-
ond Reading,”Hansard, June 8, 1999, 114.
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sexual violence was becoming more gruesome, more horrific, and more
graphic each year.26
Statistics indicating increases in the incidence of sexual violence are
controversial, attributed at times to increased awareness as well as to bet-
ter methods of reporting and recording rapes. Respondents in this study
suggested that Namibians were experiencing a change in the nature of sex-
ual violence, tied to larger shifts in the social fabric of the postconflict con-
text. A salient example of the increased brutality of sexual violence came
from a prosecutor who indicated that she has seen an increase in the num-
ber of women whose throats had been slit by their partners, in the same
manner as one would slaughter a goat. Linking this horrific form of sex-
ual violence to older common-law conceptions of women as property,
akin to livestock, this prosecutor echoed rhetoric that surfaced in parlia-
mentary debates.27
Some interview participants tied increasingly brutal sex crimes to a
backlash against the advancement of women in the new Namibian gov-
ernment. One antirape activist, who serves on the board of a family vio-
lence shelter, suggested that this need to hurt women more was a direct
result of women’s advancement:
Women are taking control and educating themselves. Men have
had very little in their backgrounds except fighting. They fought for
liberation. They fought in the struggle. They have not transitioned
in their roles. Women are moving into leadership roles throughout
society, and in the corporate world. The men received no counsel-
ing the entire time they were in the struggle.
Women have no support—no one to show them the way in these
new areas. They have no support in growing into these roles. Women
have to be the wife, the business woman, and the submissive part-
ner. This is the challenge. From eight to five, they have to be on top of
business, then come home and be the submissive wife. Part of this is
the income women are receiving because of the affirmative action. Now
with their own jobs, they can be independent from their husbands.
It is like the message is being sent out that “I need to hurt you
more.” It is about a level of control.28
26 Interview questions did not specifically address the qualitative change in the nature of
rapes. This finding emerged through participants’ independent discourse during the course of
the research.
27 Interview by Britton, Windhoek, July 12, 2008.
28 Interview by Britton, Windhoek, July 9, 2008.
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According to this antirape activist, violence is intended to put women
back into their place in society. This is not an isolated account: “Most
men in Namibia are not happy about the current trend in Namibia that
is aimed at empowering women. Men are frequently intimidated by the
rising status of women and see this as a direct threat to their own social
position. . . . [One] serious challenge women face is men’s negative
attitudes toward contemporary gender equality movements” ðLeBeau,
Iipinge, and Conteh2004,492Þ.Whensomemenperceive theirprivilege to
be under threat, their response can be violent. If men “think that the ad-
vancement of women’s rights can only occur at the cost of a reduction
of men’s rights” ðLeBeau and Spence 2004, 50Þ, they may seek to turn the
clock back to an earlier era of male domination. Some interview participants
link the change in violence to current socioeconomic stress and un-
certainties about the future of the country. As particular forms of masculinity
are destabilized—as women assume greater responsibilities as breadwin-
ners and decisionmakers—some men may violently reassert gender norms.
Concerns about backlash are not unique to Namibia. Some scholars
identify backlash as a possible consequence of the fast track of women
into national politics ðBritton 2006; Moffett 2006; Bhana, de Lange, and
Mitchell 2009Þ. Others link the phenomenon to demobilization in the
aftermath of armed conflict and a desire to return to “normalcy.” As Meg
Samuelson ð2007, 840–41Þ has noted in the context of South Africa,
“The ‘normalcy’ to which women are returned, and which they are called
to represent, requires women warriors to reclaim the home as their nat-
ural domain and to render themselves sexually available to men. Ideolo-
gies of domesticity and acts of sexual violence are two means by which
this return to ‘normalcy’ may be enforced.” Just as the normalcy of male
dominance was maintained through rape of women resistance fighters
during the liberation struggle, rape may play a key role in reestablishing
gendered power relations in postconflict transitions.
Other scholars and activists trace qualitative changes in the nature of
violence to a failure to address apartheid-era atrocities that remain buried
in the collective consciousness of the nation. Since Namibia did not sub-
ject these atrocities to public examination as part of its process of national
reconciliation, some suggest that these wounds have become more insid-
ious as silence masks national complicity. Although the South African case
demonstrates that truth commissions do not lead directly to decreases in
gender-based violence ðKrog 2001Þ, the absence of explicit mechanisms of
transitional justice in Namibia ensnares rape and gender-based violence ex-
clusively in the private sphere.
Causal explanations of gender-based violence are notoriously difficult to
prove, but perceptions linking increases in sexual violence and increasingly
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brutal sexual assaults to changing gender roles and relations are wide-
spread in Namibia. Women’s bodies remain a battleground in the postwar
era. As women manifest their agency in new ways in peacetime, they ex-
perience continued violence. Tensions between national transitions and
familiar gender power relations are inscribed on women’s flesh.
Conclusion: The way forward
Namibian efforts to address gender-based violence illuminate both the
possibilities and the limitations of progressive legislation in a nation strug-
gling to overcome financial challenges, restricted resources, long histo-
ries of armed conflict, and legacies of silence. Successful mobilization by
antirape activists in conjunction with international protocols on violence
against women and creative initiatives by elected officials shaped the pro-
gressive Combating Rape Act. Yet the parliamentary debates surrounding
its passage reveal the persistence of oppressive views about rape that have
roots in common law, customary law, colonial experience, and Namibia’s
history of armed conflict.
Our findings suggest that successful implementation of the law re-
quires that patriarchal beliefs about sexual violence be changed. As fem-
inist scholars have long recognized, there are limits to using the law to
change public attitudes, and this is clearly the case in the area of sexual
assault. As Morrison Torrey ð1995Þ has demonstrated, changes in the
legal code do not always produce more prosecutions or arrests in cases
of sexual violence. In the Namibian case, antirape activists, government
ministers, and community leaders interpret the meaning of the Combat-
ing Rape Act in markedly different ways, and these diverse interpretations
affect how the law is implemented. When certain men and women do not
believe that coerced sexual exchanges constitute rape and when police and
members of the populace assume that there can be no rape within mar-
riage, progressive definitions in the act will not be enforced. Laws do not
automatically shift norms or beliefs.
Failure to enforce progressive laws is not a reason to abandon legal
strategies for social transformation, but the law must be supplemented
with other mechanisms to change popular assumptions, discourses, and
everyday practices. Innovative legislation may be a necessary step, but it
is not a sufficient means to eliminate sexual violence.
The persistence of assumptions about degrees of rape provides a strong
indication that national dialogue is needed to dispel myths about rape and
to change gender scripts that normalize gender inequalities. Continuing
the activism and advocacy that culminated in the Combating Rape Act
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is the most promising means to bring to create new understandings of
sexual violence that can change everyday practices at the individual, com-
munity, and national levels.
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